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Abstract
Kyoto fails to recognize the institutional vacuum to verify countries’ uncertain carbon
accounts and there is a strong debate on the potentials of carbon systems other than
fossil fuels to contribute to curbing the increases in the atmospheric carbon content. In
this paper we develop an analytical framework to address the issue of ‘how
comprehensive should a country’s reference carbon system be (not) ignoring the
interaction of the particular system with the rest of the global carbon system under the
clause of (non-) verification?’ To solve this problem we first develop a concept to
understand the trade-off between the range of potential carbon emission
reduction/carbon sequestration and the degree of uncertainty under Full Carbon
Accounting (FCA) and Partial Carbon Accounting (PCA). We then provide a formal
description of the properties of uncertainty under FCA and PCA. Finally, we suggest a
model that allows us to compute the optimal degree of comprehensiveness of a
reference carbon system that should be eligible for the mutual recognition of emission
reductions. The model is general enough to be applicable on both the project level as
well as on global scales.
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A note on decision making under changing properties
of total system errors of full carbon accounting (FCA)
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Background
Modeling global or sub-global carbon systems involves the treatment of highly complex
systems. Models play an important role in understanding the causes and consequences
of climate change and policies to alleviate negative effects. In order to make full use of
these models, it is necessary to establish the magnitude and source of uncertainty
associated with their prediction. This information can be used to achieve a better
understanding of the simulated systems, to increase the reliability of model prediction,
to guide field surveys and laboratory experiments, and to define realistic values that
should be used in scientific, economic, and political discussions of the future. The
degree of uncertainty will also sooner or later influence climate change politics in the
sense that carbon emission reduction will be required to be verifiable. The uncertainties
of large-scale carbon accounts may be too large for Kyoto measures to be globally
verifiable in the twenty year period from 1990 to 2010 (see Jonas et al., 1999; Rypdal
and Zhang, 2000).
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 1996) identifies an uncertainty
of fossil fuel emissions to be in the range of ±10% for Annex I countries, which is larger
than the committed reduction of many of those countries. The uncertainty of biological
systems is believed by most reseachers to be larger than those of fossil fuel systems
(see, e.g., IPCC, 1996; Houghton, 1999; Schimel et al., 2000). Although The 2nd
Precautionary Principle can be applied here, it seems to be perfectly legitimate for
critics to scrutinize the very existence of the Kyoto Protocol on the grounds of the non-
verifiability of Kyoto measures. Verifiability is intimately linked to the quantification of
uncertainties. On the project level uncertainties are not only linked to internal
uncertainty, but are also linked to negative spill-over effects (leakages) with the rest of
the system. Therefore, the nature of uncertainty depends upon the type and
comprehensiveness of carbon accounting underlying the evaluation of a project or
2reported emission reduction for a country. We, thus, propose to distinguish between a
weak and a strong verification concept, where under PCA the weak verification and
under FCA the strong verification concept applies. This is due to the fact that if we
consider PCA1 as the chosen accounting method we find small random errors, but
potential large biases due to spill-over effects remain unknown under PCA. It is hoped
that under PCA the concept of additionality by establishing base-line scenarios could
eliminate some biases but, as we argue in this paper, unless a system of FCA is
established the additionality problem cannot be solved due to methodological
limitations. In addition, under PCA parties will not be able to maximize emission
reductions due to foregone least cost measures of a restricted choice set, which are not
included under PCA. On the other hand, under FCA we can, in principle, be able to
maximize emission reduction and participating parties will be able to reduce biases as
claimed earlier. However, large system internal errors under FCA might bring a number
of countries (regions, projects) under unfavorable verification conditions. For such
countries a reduction of uncertainty based on improved inventories might turn out to be
a cheap way to gain verifiability — at least in a post-Kyoto period.
The evaluation of greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction is a rather problematic undertaking,
especially with respect to the reliability of the reduction estimates and the credibility of
the institutional set-up of ruling, monitoring, evaluating, reporting, and verifying.
Doubts about reliability arise due to (1) differing interpretations of sources and sink
categories or other definitions, assumptions, units, etc., (2) use of simplified
representations with averaged values (e.g., emission factors), (3) inherent uncertainty in
the scientific understanding of the basic processes leading to emissions and removals,
(4) operational risk (e.g., if energy-consuming equipment is not used as projected), and
(5) performance risk (engineering, systems design and equipment performance) (Vine
and Sathaye, 1997). With respect to uncertainty, there is still a lack of mutual
understanding among carbon researchers not only on the methodology of how to
estimate uncertainties but also about the uncertainty concept per se. Given the problems
of inter alia artificial system boundaries, imperfect experimental design and
measurement, up to the use of borrowed conversion factors and guessed parameter
estimates we need to ask questions like: “What do reported uncertainties say and not
say?” Or, another question is whether it is necessary to always model entire systems or
is it enough to study isolated subsystems and what can we say about the total system
errors of both approaches?
In order to address these questions we need to reflect on the systems properties of
carbon models with respect to how much they can tell us about the uncertainty and
potential emission reduction. From a general modeling point of view, it is generally
known that the simplest models (e.g., non-structural time series analysis) create the
smallest prediction error, where in contrast very complex structural models can exhibit
vast internal errors making meaningful projections almost impossible. When modelers
                                               
1
 The Kyoto Protocol foresees a system of partial carbon accounting (PCA) where biological sources and
sinks are only partially included. Partial carbon accounting, however, means that only a restricted set of
actions are allowed to reduce carbon emissions, which are mainly related to the reduction of fossil fuel
emissions. It should also be acknowledged, however, that over 2 * 1015 G Cyr-1 arise from net fluxes from
the destruction of vegetation (not taking into account the foregone loss of sink strength), where 5 * 1015 G
Cyr-1 are due to FF emissions.   
3design models they a priori determine the level of uncertainty the model will generate
and the degree of insight they gain in the functioning of the system by using models.
Thus, a researcher has to consider an uncertainty/systems insight trade-off. This paper is
about trying to define some systems theoretic framework to improve the understanding
concerning this trade-off in order to be able to work towards a more general decision
theory.2
Defining Uncertainties
Uncertainties arise due to the stochastic nature of the underlying system and from
knowledge gaps and imperfect measurability of the carbon system processes. The
research community must admit that mankind still knows very little about the true
global and (sub-)global greenhouse gas exchange budgets of the earth’s ecosystems
(including all human activities) with the atmosphere. Before we start to quantify
uncertainties we need to define the uncertainty concept as such and analyze its role
under FCA and PCA. Discussion with many colleagues has shown that the
interpretation of uncertainty depends on how researchers view the system they are
looking at and whether they have a ‘statistical’ or ‘physical’ mind. As a consequence,
the method of carbon modeling and the team mix somehow also dictates the way
uncertainties are interpreted. There have been a number of attempts to classify
uncertainties relating to the use of greenhouse gas guidelines, which mainly refer to
PCA types of accounting (e.g., Shvidenko et al., 1996; Vine and Sathaye, 1997; Jonas et
al., 1998; SBSTA, 1998; Nabuurs et al., 1999; Vine et al., 1999). However, little work
has been done to understand uncertainties from a FCA perspective and to try to put
uncertainties into a comparative picture with PCA (see also Jonas et al., 1999).
Figure 1 provides an overview of the levels of uncertainty components in the context of
different accounting methods and feasible ranges of potential emission reduction. An
analysis of the economic interpretation of the interplay of emission reduction and
uncertainty with respect to verification is provided in Obersteiner et al. (2000a). In
Figure 1 we distinguish three different carbon accounting systems.
The first accounting system is recommended by the IPCC (1996, 1999), which is based
on PCA comprising almost the entire fossil fuel system with only partial inclusion of
biological sources and sinks. The second carbon accounting system is FCA. According
to Jonas et al. (1999), FCA is a full carbon budget that encompasses and integrates all
carbon related components of all terrestrial (and aquatic) ecosystems (including the
technosphere) and is applied continuously in time. The concept of FCA involves
uncertainties as an integral part as illustrated in Jonas et al. (1999). Since FCA involves
a larger set of subsystems (a larger set of variables describing the states of a larger
system) the summarized or total system error (measured by random errors) are larger
than under PCA.3 Moreover, under the current reporting schemes uncertainties do not
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 In a decision theoretic setting, the purpose of estimating the parameter is to use the data to formulate a
decision. In a statistical setting, the decision depends on the estimated parameter and will be erroneous if
the empirical parameter does not equal the true parameter. The concept of the quadratic loss functions
supposes that the cost associated with a decision is proportional to the square of the difference between
the estimate and the true parameter.
3
 This point is treated later in a more formal way.
4play a meaningful role under the PCA reporting prescriptions. However, there is an
IPCC process underway to at least try to fully quantify uncertainties in a consistent way.
However, under such a PCAU (Partial Carbon Account involving uncertainties, which is
the third carbon accounting system) uncertainties are only documented, but the parties
still fail to include uncertainties in the process of the mutual recognition of binding legal
commitments. This IPCC process still takes on an anthropogenic systems view, which
proved to be insufficient to quantify total system errors of biological systems (see
Nilsson et al., 2000 for a discussion of errors in biological systems).
Figure 1: Uncertainty levels and potential emission reduction under PCA, PCAU and
FCA.4 From the left Chart (I) we see that the internal error increases with the
comprehensiveness of the system (i.e., PCA systems exhibit smaller internal
errors (summarized random errors) than the larger FCA system). With
respect to the probability of the occurrence of biases (Chart (II)) there is an
inverse relationship between the comprehensiveness of the system and the
error. The possibility set of emission reduction always increases with the
comprehensiveness of the system.
In Figure 1 we distinguish between two types of errors which are related to the potential
emission reductions in the three carbon accounting systems. Figure 2 provides a
graphical representation of the different error components. The random error is used
here in the sense of the statistical definition of white noise (signal without information
content) and for simplicity we assume that the summarized random error equals the
internal error. This assumption seems to be justified due to the fact that biases are hard
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 F∆ stands for the potential emission reduction induced by Kyoto measures and ε  stands for the
involved error.  We distinguish random errors and systematic errors (biases).
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5to assess within a closed system in the absence of reference points and benchmarks.
Random errors are errors that affect the precision of a set of measurements or, under
some restrictions, the precision of any continuous function of random variables.
Random errors scatter measurements above and below the empirical mean of various
distributions, with small random errors being more likely than large. Precision is
reproducibility or a measure of the random error. Precision is measured by the standard
deviation or the standard deviation of the mean value, where the latter is an inverse
function of the square root of the number of observations.
Figure 2: A hypothetical uncertainty range for two set of measurements of the same
phenomenon.
Biases are mainly related to white spots and fuzzy areas on the carbon knowledge
landscape. Systematic errors (also called bias) affect the accuracy of the results.
Accuracy is correctness or a measure of the systematic error. The accuracy of a
measurement is assessed by comparing the measurement with the accepted value (the
difference between the true and accepted value is unknown, in itself, perceiving this
difference is soft knowledge), based on evidence independent of the measurement.
However, in most subsystems of PCA, and more so of FCA, the true and accepted value
is unknown and could be beyond the uncertainty range as indicated in Figure 2. Box 1
provides a classification of the sources of error according to two principally different
types of sources — hard and soft knowledge (see Nilsson et al., 2000 for more
discussion).
Higher accuracy
Lower precision
Lower accuracy
Higher precision
True
 value
Accepted
value
Quantified Systematic
Error or Measured Bias
Random Error
Quantified Systematic Error
 or Measured Bias
Uncertainty Range
True Systematic Error
or Unknown Bias
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knowledge
6Coming back to the basic message contained in Figure 1: From the left plot (I) we see
that the larger the carbon accounting system becomes the larger the random error and
the larger the range of possible emission reduction.5 This is due to the fact that under
current conditions biological systems exhibit a larger random error. In addition, as we
will formally show later, due to the law of error propagation by nature larger systems
exhibit larger total random errors. It should be noted here that smaller countries are
disadvantaged to report small random errors. This is due to the fact that (1) the standard
error of the mean value is an inverse function of the square root of the number of
observations, which means that smaller countries would need more observations for a
carbon unit than a larger country to reach the same precision; and (2) thus, also the costs
per unit carbon would become larger on a comparative basis. This means that reporting
on biological carbon systems on a national level is sub-optimal.
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 The notion of size or largeness refers to the number of variables needed to describe the system of
interest (e.g., PCA versus FCA), i.e., the dimensionality of the system increases the more the collection of
subsystems describes the full carbon system.
Box 1: Classification of Sources of Errors
Hard knowledge (adapted from Shvidenko et al., 1996):
Oversimplification
Sampling
Definitions and classification schemes
Shortcomings of available data
Imperfect and incomplete measurement
Extrapolation
Up-scaling
Time series models
Sampling scheme
Leakage (Jonas et al., 1999)
Spatial
Temporal
Soft knowledge (Expert judgement (IPCC, 1999)):
Unconscious biases
Process understanding
Availability bias
Representativeness bias
Anchoring and adjustment bias
Conscious biases
Motivational bias
Overconfident estimate of unqualified expert
Managerial bias
Selection bias
7With respect to systematic errors (biases) we conjecture that the probability of biases
decreases with the completeness of the system. This is, of course, a working hypothesis,
since in both PCA and FCA the true value is unknown. Without a benchmark no
meaningful ranking can be established on a comparative basis.6 Nonetheless, it is fair to
assume that under FCA biases are minimized based on the following arguments:
1. Due to more consistent, complete and comprehensive analysis an improved
understanding of the processes will lead to the elimination of some possible biases.
This is especially true if an entire system or subsystem is analyzed separately using
different models (e.g., ground inventory and remote sensing of biological and
technospheric processes) or if competing research networks are able to pin down
uncertainty boundaries and establish accepted true values as benchmarks.
2. FCA might eliminate biases through a top-down verification if the geographic
coverage is of a sufficiently large scale. Top-down verification is not possible under
PCA.
3. In a dynamic system of FCA, temporal and spatial spillovers are more likely to be
detected.
We argue that in reality also the total error of an individual variable is the sum of a pure
random error and a bias, i.e., 222 rB sss += . Thus, there are two sources of error
associated with each variable within a subsystem. We conjecture that an increase in the
number of subsystems decreases the probability of uncorrected biases. Under the
condition that the difference in the biases between FCA (larger system) and PCA
(smaller system) is larger than the difference in the summarized random error between
FCA and PCA, the total error of FCA would turn out to be smaller than that of the PCA,
i.e., 221
2
1
222
11
)()(
++
+=>+= ++ iii rBiirBii ssBPsssBPs  (here i stands for the number of
subsystems and it is assumed that i+1 system was the final complement to establish the
FCA). This is another reason why under FCA the total system error could turn out to be
smaller than the total system error under PCA.
Spatial and temporal spillovers arise from spatial or temporal correlation between
variables. A simple example would be where emission reduction measures lead to
decreased consumption of fossil fuels (FF), with the result that the underlying global
commodity markets face falling prices due to supply slacks. Reduced fossil fuel prices
will lead to an increased consumption of FF in less developed countries outside the
Kyoto agreement, such as future key players such as China and India. Such
compensatory effects could neutralize the emission reduction in the commitment
country in the short run (spatial correlation), but technological lock-ins in developing
countries could lead to increased global FF emissions in the long-run (spatial and
temporal correlation). In addition, falling prices increase the time of amortization of the
large sunk costs related to resource extraction and distribution networks causing a
temporal extension of the supply slack (temporal correlation). Spatial spillovers could
also arise from plantations if they are established on agricultural sites that are more
                                               
6
 Gödel’s “imperfectness principle” in its strongest possible form asserts that a fundamental theory cannot
EHSHUIHFW HLWKHULWLVLQFRQVLVWHQWRULWLVLQVXIILFLHQWWRVROYHVRPHRILWVSUREOHPV*ödel, 1931). To
our knowledge there is, however, no theorem on the relation of completness and degree of inconsistency
or insufficiency, which would be of special interest in our context.
8needed to satisfy soaring food demand, thereby resulting in soil carbon depletion due to
intensive agricultural practices and deforestation elsewhere.7
Comparing (I) and (II) in Figure 1, we see that the bliss point can not be reached under
PCA. The bliss point would be defined by the combination of the lowest possible error
and the highest feasible emission reduction potential. Under FCA the feasible range of
emission reduction potentials is larger compared to PCA due to the fact that under a
fixed budget a wider set of mitigation measures can be applied. A wider choice set
makes it more likely that lower cost strategies can be implemented leading to increased
emission reduction or increased sink strength on the country level. Emission reduction
could, however, also be smaller under FCA compared to PCA if the cost of uncertainty
reduction outweighs the ‘choice set advantage’ — on a relative scale, despite lower
costs for carbon flux reduction, there are fewer resources left to reduce carbon
emissions under FCA due to higher expenditures to eliminate uncertainties. Under this
scenario the emission reduction is smaller in FCA since uncertainties come at a cost as
discussed in the model below. Thus, if in FCA the relative share of uncertainties is
sufficiently larger than in PCA and verification is a binding condition, higher average
costs per unit of carbon emission reduction leads to less carbon emission reduction in
FCA. However, this is also in part due to the fact that under PCA some biases are
ignored and the verification is weaker. Considering these points, hereafter we call
verification under PCA weak verification and verification under FCA strong
verification.8
Mathematical Description of the Properties of
Uncertainty Under FCA and PCA
Proposition 1: Perfectly Separable and Independent Subsystems
FCA can be derived from a set of perfect and perfectly separable PCAs
( ∑=
i
PCA
i
FCA FF ). If F is a function describing the net flux form, a PCA carbon system
using the two random variables x1 (fossil fuel system) and x2 (Article 3.3 LUF measures)
with the associated second moments 2
1x
s , 2
2x
s  and, in addition, x3 (complement of the
PCA carbon system with respect to FCA system), ( 2
3x
s ) are needed to describe the entire
system of the FCA, it follows that:
2
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 Here we ignore the many other social welfare losses.
8
 The analysis in this paper ignores the difference between trend and level uncertainty and its implications
for verification.
9Proposition 2: Interacting Subsystems
FCA cannot directly be derived from a set of PCAs due to interactions between the PCA
systems ( ∑≠
i
PCA
i
FCA FF ). If F is again the function describing the fluxes of the perfect
FCA described by the same variables, it follows that the total system errors are defined
by:
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In words, this means that if the increase in total error from enlarging the PCA system is
larger than the error from omitting error correction from interaction of the subsystems,
then the total system error of PCA is smaller than the total error from FCA.
The law of error propagation allows us to consider only first order interactions,
however, interactions are also possible of a higher order, which in our example would
be defined by an interaction term as a function of x1, x2, x3.
Formulation of the Decision Problem of Enlarging the Carbon
System Under Weak and Strong Verification Conditions
Based on the concepts developed in Obersteiner et al.(2000a,b) we will develop, in this
paper, a decision rule to allow for optimally choosing the size (comprehensiveness) of
the carbon system under weak and strong verifiability. We will first describe the
variables entering the decision problem and then set up the problem as such and then we
will shortly discuss the implications of the model for implementation as a decision
support for projects and for country strategies. In Obersteiner et al. (2000a,b) we have
derived a decision rule that allows us to compute the optimal choice of emission
reduction and uncertainty reduction within a Kyoto-type framework. Consider a Kyoto
world where a country has to choose its path of emission reduction to meet an agreed
emission target (Kt) (see Figure 3). In order to meet the terms of the contract the country
10
must choose a certain rate of emission reduction, 
dt
dF
, for each time period t.9 Emission
reduction involves a cost cF to finance projects that reduce carbon emissions or induce
increased carbon sequestration. Likewise, regulations, fees and carbon taxes that are
targeted to decrease GHG emissions come at economic cost.10 If the measures taken are
not sufficient or if the cost of emission reduction in the country is too large, countries
are allowed to reach the Kyoto target by carbon trading or other flexible arrangements.
On the other hand, countries that shoot over the Kyoto target are allowed to sell their
surplus on the carbon market or bank it for use in subsequent periods.
Figure 3: Simplified linear graphical representation of the key variables concerned.
Illustration for increasing net carbon emissions (Ft < Ft+1 ) and decreasing in
their uncertainty (εt > εt+1) (Source: Adapted from Jonas et al., 1999).
In principle there are two ways of dealing with uncertainties. First, countries could be
penalized for uncertainties and second, countries are allowed to reduce this penalty by
reducing the level of uncertainty. Both options are expressed as variables in the model
set-up. Assume that a country starts with an initial degree of uncertainty
( )−+ −==
111 2
1
2
1
ttt FFεε  in t1=1990. Uncertainties can be changed at a rate of
1+−=∆ tttdt
d
εε
ε
. Depending on the nature of uncertainty, as discussed in the previous
section, the uncertainties refer to PCA taking or not taking interactions into account or
refer to FCA, i.e., uncertainty can be defined as FCAssPCAPCA ji εεε ,, 0= . If uncertainties
cannot be reduced, the country will be penalized for the remaining uncertainty.
A model needs to be constructed that provides a decision rule for a specific country to
optimally reduce emissions and/or reduce uncertainties given a certain degree of
                                               
9
 For a list of the variables and units, see the Appendix.
10
 It is, of course, possible that energy cost savings and innovation triggered economic growth create
positive externalities that compensate for such costs.
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comprehensiveness of the reference system. To solve the problem of the optimal choice
of emission reduction versus uncertainty reduction we formulate a profit maximization
(loss minimization) for a certain commitment period for the particular reference carbon
system. Profits are maximized by optimally choosing carbon emission reductions
( t
dt
dF
t
dt
dFF ∆

 ∆−=∆ sgn ) and change of uncertainties )sgn( t
dt
d
t
dt
d ∆

 ∆−=∆ εεε
over this one period yrst 20=∆ .11 In the aggregate in order to achieve market clearing
revenues must balance costs. Revenues, within a Kyoto framework, are calculated by
the (discounted12) value of total reported emission reductions corrected for uncertainties
in 2010 (which is the uncertainty in 1990 )(ε  minus its change over the 20 year
period).13 Total revenue is positive if emission reduction is verifiable and the emission
target was reached, and negative if emission reduction is not verifiable and/or the
emission target was not reached. The price p is assumed to be the aggregate solution of
the respective competitive carbon market. Two types of costs arise if the country
decides to take its own steps to actively reduce carbon emissions:
(1) Total cost of emission reduction, which is equal to the total amount of carbon
reduced over the commitment period multiplied by the specific average cost Fc .
The specific average cost is a function of F∆  and should exhibit the usual
properties needed for microeconomic analyses (e.g., Varian, 1992). On a country
level this cost function not only includes technological variables but also factors
such as population and economic growth; and
(2) Total cost of uncertainty reduction, which is equal to the total amount of carbon
reduced over the commitment period multiplied by the specific average cost εc .
Similar to cF , εc  is a function of ε∆  and is assumed to exhibit the required
properties in microeconomic analyses.
                                               
11
 The model set up is general enough so that F∆ can take on the definition of the necessary rate of
emission reduction to reach the Kyoto target in 2010 or any other emission reduction target under a
different convention also taking into account the polluter pays principle and the principle of equity.
12
 For simplicity we ignore a discount rate for this period problem. In addition, there are methodological
issues to be solved of applying a discount rate if the quality of rewards is not fully understood. A
multiperiod model involving a discount rate will be developed in a follow-up paper to analyze optimal
behavior under Kyoto and post-Kyoto scenarios.
13
 Note: From a methodological point of view, it is interesting to observe that we can derive the
verification time formula of Jonas et al. (1999) from the revenue function:
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∂ . If we are interested in a more statistical interpretation of the
verification time concept and ignoring for reasons of simplicity the change in uncertainty, we can apply
the Student t-Test from which follows that 
t
t
F
t w ∆=
∂
∂
ε , with tw being the tabular value of the t-Test given
the appropiate degrees of freedom using the one-sided t-Test (Note: tw is always a larger one for
confidence intervals larger that 90%, which are considered by the IPCC from which it follows that
verifications times will be larger using the statistical interpretation compared to the verification times
used by Jonas et al., 1999).
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Within one system the task is to maximize the following goal function with respect to
the two choice variables ε∆∆ ,F :
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This maximization problem can be used to analyze the optimal solution for an
individual country or even an individual project as well as for an ensemble of countries
participating in the carbon market. The optimization problem needs to be constrained by
the emission reduction target (Kt). It is demanded that the collection of countries (over-)
fulfill their joint commitment target.
However, in this paper we are interested in the ‘optimal’ comprehensiveness of the
carbon system to be used as the reference system for carbon accounting. We, thus, must
ask the question: “Which reference carbon system will maximize total profits given the
rules governing the market, i.e., under no verification clause, verification under PCA or
verification under FCA?” For this purpose, we need to distinguish at least two carbon
systems. One that builds the core carbon system, which in the current situation is
established by the Kyoto Protocol consisting mainly of the fossil fuel carbon system,
and the other that is added to the FF system, which if we move toward FCA would be
the complementary rest of the carbon system. Let us now call BBF ε,∆  the change in
emission and its uncertainty of the core carbon system, and AAF ε,∆  the change in
emission and its uncertainty of the added carbon system, and ε,F∆  the change in
emission and its uncertainty of the total FCA carbon system. The decision rule of
whether or not to enlarge the core carbon system will depend on whether total profits
can be expected to be increased. Consequently we are interested in maximizing the
positive difference between the profits gained from taking the core and the added
system as the reference system and profits from the core system, i.e., ).max( BBA pipi −
Setting up the problem to compute BApi  looks as follows:
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )vvABAB
v
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FFFFKt
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,,,
max
There are a few additional details that need to be considered in this set-up. First we
introduce a factor µ , which symbolizes a linear interaction factor for emission
reduction measures taken in both systems. µ  can either take on positive or negative
values depending on the type of interaction. Furthermore, the subscript in vε  stands for
the different types of interpretation of the uncertainty, i.e., FCAssPCAPCA ji εεε ,, 0= .
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From this set-up we can, analogously to Obersteiner et al. (2000a), compute the optimal
decision rule for );,,,,,( ,,,,** KtccccFF ABABABAB FFvAB µε εε ′′∆=∆ . BAF*∆  is then a
function of the initial uncertainty, the average cost and the marginal average cost of
emission reduction and uncertainty reduction, the interaction term, and the emission
reduction target. Likewise, we can compute the optimal decision rules of uncertainty
reduction );,,,,,(
,,,,
** Ktcccc ABABABAB
BA
FFv µεεε εε ′′∆=∆ . 
BA*ε∆  is a function of the initial
uncertainty, the average cost and the marginal average cost of uncertainty reduction and
emission reduction, the interaction term, and the emission reduction target. Given the
optimal decision rules and necessary parameters like the Kyoto target, the cost schedule
for abatement strategies and sink enhancement measures, the interaction parameter, the
initial level of uncertainty of the relevant carbon system as well as the cost schedule for
uncertainty reduction a country can specify its optimal Kyoto policy with respect to opt
for the optimal comprehensiveness of the reference carbon system under a given
institutional setting demanding no, weak or strong verification. All of the variables
entering the decision rules are ex ante quantifiable and the computation of the maximum
difference of the profits is then straightforward.
Summary and Conclusion
Our analysis shows that there is a strong indication that it is paramount to always
operate in a FCA framework even if actual measures are taken in a PCA manner. If
carbon subsystems are sufficiently interlinked then the relative error of interaction with
the rest of the system becomes larger the smaller the subsystem gets. Thus, meaningful
baselines can only be established if they are computed in a FCA framework.
In our analysis we defined uncertainties by means of two error categories — random
errors and biases. Within the category of biases we distinguish between conscious and
unconscious biases. We have shown that the summarized random error (we also called
internal error) increases with the number of subsystems added. Thus, a FCA system will
by definition always exhibit larger internal errors than its subcomponents. Contrarily the
probability of undetected biases is larger in PCA systems. With respect to the potential
range of carbon reduction measures FCA systems, compared to PCA systems, are
superior due to their maximum comprehensiveness. However, in a situation where the
uncertainties of the FCA system are too large it proves to be better to exclude a highly
uncertain subsystem from the reference carbon system eligible for a Kyoto-type market.
Under the condition of strong verification, an exclusion is allowable as long as the
interactions of this system with the total system are known and taken into account (e.g.,
import-export statistics are reliable versus fraudulent production figures for the
calculation of apparent domestic consumption).
From the above it follows that accounting should be separately treated from accountable
activities for trading and mutual recognition of emission reductions. With respect to the
nature of uncertainties biased reporting can be used for intentional cheating and should
thus be eliminated from accountable emission reduction claims. As shown in this paper
it is reasonable to assume that the probability of biases decreases with the
comprehensiveness of the system analyzed, because we can make consistency checks. It
is, thus, indispensable to always monitor the entire GHG system (Full GHG Accounting
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[FGA]) irrespective of what kind of actions are credited for in the Kyoto mechanism. A
FGA should always be the compulsory monitoring system, whereas actions that are the
means to get to the target and are subject to the Kyoto market rules have to be
accounted for as (a) consistent subsystem(s) (Partial GHG Account [PGA]) within a
FGA. Verification should make sure that the acknowledged credit influences the
atmospheric GHG balance in the intended (claimed) fashion. FGA provides the
necessary accounting framework and carries the possibility of top-down verification
under certain conditions. These conclusions are also in line with the most recent
findings in the field of economic and thermodynamic analysis (Baumgärtner, 2000).
Under the condition that we are allowed to exclude subsystems from FCA, we must
give answers to the question of the optimal comprehensiveness of the reference carbon
system that should be eligible for the mutual recognition of emission reduction. In this
paper, we developed a decision rule that gives an answer to this problem under various
types of verification modi. Based on analysis using the law of error propagation we are
confronted with the computation of, in principle, four types of error definition to be
used for verification: (1) the error is zero; (2) error excluding interactions with other
systems (internal error); (3) error including interaction with another PCA system; and
(4) error including interactions with the global rest of the FCA system. For the
computation of the optimal comprehensiveness, interactions are not only of interest with
respect to the computation of errors but combining measures (PCA systems) can lead to
positive and negative spillover effects (feedback loops) in reducing emissions/carbon
sequestration.
Future research will be on the empirical computation of the optimal comprehensiveness
for a set of countries. Another task will be to establish a criteria and indicator catalogue
for the concepts of weak and strong verifiability and we will also need to look into
issues of the institutional set-up and implementability of these concepts.
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